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 Courting Constitutional Danger: 
Constitutional Conventions and the 
Legacy of the Patriation Reference  
Adam M. Dodek* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As election results came in on the night of May 2, 2011, the justices 
of the Supreme Court of Canada likely breathed a collective sigh of 
relief. This suspected judicial solace would not have been due to any 
particularly political allegiance along the lines of that reported on 
election night in the United States in 2000, when Bush seemed to be 
sliding by Gore by a chad.1 Rather, it is because the election of a majority 
government swept aside the possibility that the courts — and eventually 
the high court itself — could be called upon to adjudicate a host of 
highly contentious political issues. In a sense, the justices of the Supreme 
Court of Canada should have been expressing thanks to the voters of 
Canada for saving the judges from themselves; for the cause of this 
collective judicial anxiety lies in the Supreme Court’s judgment in the 
Patriation Reference.2  
When the Supreme Court convened at the end of April 1981 to hear 
argument in the Patriation Reference the country did not quite hang in the 
balance, but Pierre Trudeau’s constitutional reform package certainly did. 
It might be interesting to imagine constitutional counter-factuals: what 
                                                                                                             
*  Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa (Common Law Section). Thanks to my co-
panellists at the Osgoode Constitutional Cases Conference on April 15, 2011, Peter Russell, Jean-
François Gaudreault-DesBiens and Carissima Mathen. A double thanks to my colleague Carissima 
Mathen for providing me with further food for thought for this article in her presentation on “The 
Use and Misuse of the Reference Function” at the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law Public Law 
Group’s first annual Emerging Issues in Canadian Public Law conference in May 2011.  
1  See Alan M. Dershowitz, Supreme Injustice: How the High Court Hijacked Election 
2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), at 156-57, citing Evan Thomas & Michael Isikoff, 
“The Truth Behind the Pillars” Newsweek (December 25, 2000) (reporting on the alleged partisan 
preferences of certain U.S. Supreme Court justices in the outcome of the 2000 Presidential election 
between George W. Bush and Al Gore). 
2  Reference re Amendment of Constitution of Canada, [1981] S.C.J. No. 58, [1981] 1 
S.C.R. 753 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Patriation Reference”].  
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would have been had the Supreme Court refused to answer the question 
regarding the existence of a convention requiring provincial consent for 
proceeding with constitutional amendments that affect provincial jurisdic-
tion? Would Trudeau have proceeded unilaterally? Would Trudeau’s 
constitutional reforms have suffered the same fate as Fulton-Favreau, the 
Victoria Charter and so many proposals, consigned to the dustbin of 
political history? What would the last 30 years have been like in Canada 
without the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?3 
These are interesting questions, perhaps frightening to some, but we 
need not consider them because Trudeau’s constitutional reform package 
did of course succeed, in no small part due to the twin decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in the Patriation Reference and the Quebec 
Veto Reference.4 However, the legacy of these cases is more political than 
jurisprudential. It is fair to say that while the Patriation Reference was 
greeted by a warm response for its political implications, it received a 
lukewarm to negative reaction for its judicial craft. This is perhaps best 
summed up in the phrase “bold statescraft, questionable jurisprudence”, 
which is the title of Peter Russell’s contribution to a book of essays about 
the Constitution Act, 1982.5 
Leading constitutional experts of the day disparaged the Supreme 
Court’s judgment in the Patriation Reference, especially its decision to 
address the convention question. Eugene Forsey called the decision of 
the six judges on convention “not a very impressive performance, despite 
the rapture with which it was greeted by (surprise!) the eight provincial 
Governments and much of the press”.6 Edward McWhinney dubbed it 
“complex and baffling and technically unsatisfactory”.7 Peter Hogg 
commented:  
I think it is fair to say that the Supreme Court of Canada’s first foray 
into political science did not yield very satisfactory reasoning or 
conclusions. That is not surprising. The existence and definition of a 
                                                                                                             
3  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].  
4  Reference re Quebec Constitutional Amendment (No. 2), [1982] S.C.J. No. 101, [1982] 2 
S.C.R. 793 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Quebec Veto Reference”].  
5  Peter Russell, “Bold Statescraft, Questionable Jurisprudence” in Keith Banting & Richard 
Simeon, eds., And No One Cheered: Federalism, Democracy and the Constitution Act (Toronto: 
Methuen, 1983) [hereinafter “Banting & Simeon”] 210.  
6  The Hon. Eugene A. Forsey, “The Courts and the Conventions of the Constitution” 
(1984) 33 U.N.B.L.J. 11, at 37 [hereinafter “Forsey, ‘The Courts and the Conventions of the 
Constitution’”].  
7  Edward McWhinney, Canada and the Constitution 1979-1982 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1982), at 80 [hereinafter “McWhinney”].  
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convention has to be ascertained without the help of the prior judicial 
decisions which would support a rule of common law and without the 
sworn testimony and rules of evidence which would support a finding 
of fact”.8  
McWhinney asserted that the decision failed “in its primary responsibil-
ity of providing a clear and logically reasoned judicial argument as an 
authoritative statement to the parties actually before the Court, and also 
as an educational guide to lower courts, the legal profession and the 
general public”.9 Hogg commented at the time that the only justification 
for even considering the convention question would be to influence the 
political outcome.10 He lamented that the “court allowed itself to be 
manipulated into a purely political role”.11  
Despite the quite devastating and largely accurate criticism levelled 
at the judgment by these constitutional luminaries, injuries have largely 
been avoided.12 Nevertheless, like the land mines that litter Angola, 
Cambodia and Afghanistan, the Patriation Reference’s ruling on the 
justiciability of constitutional conventions has left latent jurisprudential 
IEDs that could explode at a future date. In the first two decades since 
the Patriation Reference, we did not face situations where constitu-
tional conventions were controversial to the point of threatening a 
political crisis. However, with the onset of minority government since 
2004 and its likelihood of continuation as part of the Canadian political 
                                                                                                             
8  Peter W. Hogg, “Comments on Legislation and Judicial Decisions: Constitutional Law — 
Amendment of the British North America Act — Role of the Provinces” (1982) 60 Can. Bar Rev. 
307, at 320 [hereinafter “Hogg, ‘Comment on the Patriation Reference’”]. Further:  
The only possible effect of answering the convention question in the Patriation Reference 
was to influence the outcome of the political negotiations over the 1981-82 constitutional 
settlement. ... In my view, the Court, which is not an elected body, and which is not polit-
ically accountable for its actions, should have confined itself to answering the legal ques-
tion, and should not have gone beyond the legal question to exert any further influence 
over the negotiations  
Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed., looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 2006), at 
§1.10(b) [hereinafter “Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada”].  
9  McWhinney, supra, note 7, at 88.  
10  Hogg, “Comment on the Patriation Reference”, supra, note 8, at 314, 324. 
11  Id., at 324. 
12  For other analysis of the Patriation Reference, see Bryan Schwartz & John D. Whyte, 
“The Patriation Reference and the Idea of Canada” (1982-83) 8 Queen’s L.J. 158; Wayne MacKay, 
“Judicial Process in the Supreme Court of Canada: The Patriation Reference and its Implications for 
the Charter of Rights” (1983) 21 Osgoode Hall L.J. 55; Peter Oliver, “The 1982 Patriation of the 
Canadian Constitution: Reflections on Continuity and Change” (1994) 28 R.J.T. 875; G.J. Brandt, 
“Judicial Mediation of Political Disputes: The Patriation Reference” (1982) 20 U.W.O. L. Rev. 101.  
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landscape,13 constitutional conventions have taken on an increasing 
importance in Canadian politics. There already have been and there will 
continue to be attempts to use this aspect of the Patriation Reference to 
manipulate the courts into influencing a particular political outcome. The 
election of May 2, 2011, presented precisely such a dangerous opportu-
nity. In this paper, I develop the concept of “constitutional danger”: the 
idea that certain events may constitute threats to our constitutional order. 
Constitutional dangers may be precipitated by actions of different actors 
in our system of government or they may simply arise through political 
serendipity. In this paper, I am concerned about judicially created 
constitutional dangers. I develop this theme by linking the events of the 
springs of 1981 and 2011.  
This paper has four parts in addition to this introduction. In Part II, I 
articulate the concept of constitutional danger. In Part III, I explain how 
the Supreme Court created such a danger in the Patriation Reference. In 
Part IV, I delve deeper into the specific problems raised by the justiciabil-
ity of constitutional conventions. Part V explains how these dangers have 
been avoided to date. Finally, the paper ends with a brief conclusion 
analyzing how the election of May 2, 2011, averted constitutional danger.  
II. CONSTITUTIONAL DANGER 
 The Supreme Court is charged with upholding our Constitution. It is 
often referred to as the “guardian of our Constitution”.14 Elsewhere, I 
                                                                                                             
13  See generally Peter Russell, Two Cheers for Minority Government: The Evolution of 
Canadian Parliamentary Democracy (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2008).  
14  On occasion, the Supreme Court has referred to itself as “guardian of the Constitution”: 
see United States of America v. Burns, [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, at para. 35 (S.C.C.); 
Pacific National Investments Ltd. v. Victoria (City), [2000] S.C.J. No. 64, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 919, at 
para. 73 (S.C.C.). More frequent are references to the courts or the judiciary as “guardians of the 
Constitution”: see, e.g., Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 155 
(S.C.C.); Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] S.C.J. No. 65, [1990] 2 
S.C.R. 232 (S.C.C.); Ell v. Alberta, [2003] S.C.J. No. 35, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 857, at para. 23 (S.C.C.); 
Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance); Rice v. New Brunswick, [2002] S.C.J. No. 13, 
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 405, at para. 35 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Kang-Brown, [2008] S.C.J. No. 18, [2008] 1 
S.C.R. 456, at para. 7 (S.C.C.). The Governor General is sometimes also referred to as “the 
guardian” of our Constitution. See Eugene Forsey, “The Crown and the Constitution” in Freedom 
and Order: Collected Essays (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1974) 34, at 48 (“The means [of 
protecting fundamental democratic rights against abuse] is the reserve power of the Crown as 
guardian of the Constitution.”). See also Brian Slattery, “Why the Governor General Matters” in 
Peter H. Russell & Lorne Sossin, eds., Parliamentary Democracy in Crisis (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2009) [hereinafter “Russell & Sossin”] 79, at 88 (“the governor general has a grave 
constitutional responsibility … She is the ultimate protector of the constitutional order.”); Andrew 
Heard, “The Governor General’s Suspension of Parliament: Duty Done or a Perilous Precedent?” in 
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have argued that the Court must protect its own integrity and that 
Parliament and the bar also share in this responsibility.15 Similarly, the 
Court has a duty to uphold the Rule of Law and protect the Constitution. 
This idea is implicit in the Court’s articulation of the unwritten constitu-
tional principles of the Rule of Law and Constitutionalism.16 It is clear 
from the Court’s judgments in recent decades that it identifies with and 
has embraced a role as defender of the Canadian constitutional order. 
The Court has willingly assumed a role as a constitutional crisis 
manager.17 Peter Hogg explains how governments have not infrequently 
sought references as a way of defusing political or legal crises: viz. the 
Manitoba Language Rights Reference,18 the Patriation Reference19 and 
the Secession Reference.20 According to Hogg, “[i]n each case, the Court 
came up with a solution that arguably exceeded the normal limits of 
judicial power, but the solution was a clever one that defused the cri-
sis.”21 Other cases might qualify for this “crisis management” category 
such as the controversial Provincial Judges Reference.22 My colleagues 
Ed Ratushny and Daphne Gilbert view this decision as “a bold but 
appropriate response to the arbitrary and unfair treatment of provincially 
appointed judges in most provinces, posting a serious threat to judicial 
independence”.23 Peter Hogg takes a starkly opposing view as one of the 
                                                                                                             
Russell & Sossin, id., 47, at 48 (“The governor general exists as an integral fail-safe mechanism for 
our parliamentary system of government.”). 
15  See Adam M. Dodek, “Constitutional Legitimacy and Responsibility: Confronting Alle-
gations of Bias After Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada” in P. Monahan & J. Cameron, eds. (2004) 
25 S.C.L.R. (2d) 165. I would add that the Executive should have a similar duty.  
16  Cf. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [19998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Secession Reference”]. 
17  See Peter W. Hogg, “Canada: From Privy Council to Supreme Court” in Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy, Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006) 55, at 96 (“Crisis Management by the Court”) [hereinafter “Hogg, ‘From Privy Council to 
Supreme Court’”].  
18  Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] S.C.J. No. 36, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Manitoba Language Rights Reference”].  
19  Supra, note 2.  
20  Supra, note 16.  
21  Hogg, “From Privy Council to Supreme Court”, supra, note 17, at 96.  
22  Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, 
[1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Provincial Judges Reference”]. 
23  Ed Ratushny & Daphne Gilbert, “The Lamer Legacy for Judicial Independence” in Adam 
Dodek & Daniel Jutras, eds., The Sacred Fire: The Legacy of Antonio Lamer (Markham, ON: 
LexisNexis Canada, 2009) [hereinafter “Dodek & Jutras”] 29, at 29. Ratushny and Gilbert assert that 
“[a] systemic solution was required and it was found by striking an important constitutional balance 
between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government.” 
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strongest critics of the Provincial Judges Remuneration Reference.24 He 
asserts that  
[t]he jurisprudence interpreting judicial independence is not based on 
any ambiguity or uncertainty in the text of the Constitution. Rather, the 
judges have constructed an elaborate edifice of doctrine with little or no 
basis in the text in order to protect the power, influence, salaries and 
perquisites of themselves and their colleagues.25  
I dwell on the Provincial Judges Remuneration Reference because the 
first rule of Supreme Court decision-making should be: “do no constitu-
tional harm.” As the debate above shows, there is significant division on 
whether the Supreme Court was constitutional hero or villain in the 
Provincial Judges Remuneration Reference. Judges are not perfect; hence 
the error-correcting functions of appellate courts and the possibility of 
legislative overruling. But the Supreme Court is different. As U.S. Su-
preme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson famously opined about his Court: 
“We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only 
because we are final.”26 Constitutional decisions are of a different magni-
tude: the legislature may or may not be able to override them27 and 
significant time may pass before the Supreme Court has the opportunity to 
revisit a prior constitutional ruling.28 The special character of constitutional 
                                                                                                             
24  See, e.g., Peter W. Hogg, “The Bad Idea of Unwritten Constitutional Principles: Protect-
ing Judicial Salaries” [hereinafter “Hogg, ‘The Bad Idea’”] in Adam Dodek & Lorne Sossin, eds., 
Judicial Independence in Context (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) 25; and Hogg, “From Privy Council to 
Supreme Court”, supra, note 17, at 74.  
25  Hogg, “From Privy Council to Supreme Court”, id. My views are more sympathetic to 
Hogg’s position than to Ratushny & Gilbert’s. See Adam M. Dodek, “Chief Justice Lamer and 
Policy Design at the Supreme Court of Canada” in Dodek & Jutras, supra, note 23, at 93.  
26  Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 at 540 (1953) (concurring). 
27  The infamous notwithstanding clause only applies to ss. 2 and 7 to 15 of the Charter. See 
Charter, s. 33. To state the obvious, the override does not apply to the other sections of the Charter 
or to other provisions of the written or unwritten Constitution. 
28  Perhaps the best example is the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Askov, [1990] S.C.J. No. 
106, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199 (S.C.C.), where the Supreme Court’s decision on the right to trial within a 
reasonable time led to 47,000 criminal charges being dropped in Ontario alone; Hogg, Constitutional 
Law of Canada, supra, note 8, at § 52.5. Justice Peter Cory of the Supreme Court of Canada stated 
publicly that he and his high court colleagues were taken by surprise by the government’s response of 
staying thousands of criminal charges following his Court’s decision in R. v. Askov, supra, on the right 
to trial within a reasonable time. See David Vienneau, “High court chocked at Ontario dismissals” 
Toronto Star (July 16, 1991) A9. At its next opportunity, the Court resiled from but did not overrule 
Askov. See R. v. Morin, [1992] S.C.J. No. 25, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771 (S.C.C.). 
Sometimes the Supreme Court does revisit a prior constitutional ruling very quickly. See R. v. 
Marshall, [1999] S.C.J. No. 66, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533 (S.C.C.), clarifying R. v. Marshall, [1999] 
S.C.J. No. 55, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 (S.C.C.). However, such “clarifications” are extremely unusual. 
However, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice McLachlin has demonstrated a willingness to 
revisit prior constitutional rulings. See generally Thomson Irvine, “Changing Course or Trimming 
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adjudication is encapsulated in Chief Justice John Marshall’s phrase: “[w]e 
must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.”29 
For these reasons, courts may apply prudential rules to avoid ruling 
on constitutional issues.30 These include the doctrines of justiciability and 
ripeness.31 As Lorne Sossin has identified, the McLachlin Court has 
demonstrated a penchant for setting out procedural processes in constitu-
tional cases rather than more firm substantive rules.32 In addition, at 
times courts rely on the rule (often honoured in the breach) of not 
deciding constitutional issues where the case can be decided on other 
grounds. 
All of these rules reflect the magnitude of the importance of constitu-
tional adjudication and the need for judicial humility in engaging in this 
enterprise. The first rule for a Supreme Court therefore should be to 
avoid doing damage to the Constitution itself. It must avoid unnecessar-
ily damaging its own integrity and that of other constitutional organs, to 
wit, the Crown, the Executive and Parliament. This does not mean that 
the Court must avoid controversy; indeed, contentious issues are destined 
for determination by supreme courts. Rather, the Supreme Court should 
not invite controversy or overstep its judicial role.33  
                                                                                                             
Sails: The Supreme Court Reconsiders” in David A. Wright & Adam M. Dodek, eds., Public Law 
at the McLachlin Court: The First Decade (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) [hereinafter “Wright & 
Dodek”]. More recently, see Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, [2011] S.C.J. No. 20, 2011 
SCC 20 (S.C.C.), revisiting the Court’s decision in Health Services and Support — Facilities 
Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.).  
29  17 U.S. (4 Wheaton) 316, at 407 (1819), quoted with approval in Law Society of Upper 
Canada v. Skapinker, [1984] S.C.J. No. 18, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357, at para. 13 (S.C.C.). On the special 
nature of constitutional adjudication and its consequences, see generally Adam M. Dodek, Complementa-
ry Comparativism: A Jurisprudence of Justification (LL.M. Thesis, University of Toronto Faculty of 
Law, 2008). 
30  Cass Sunstein has articulated a theory of “judicial minimalism” based on this idea of 
prudence in deciding constitutional issues. See Cass R. Sunstein, “Incompletely Theorized 
Agreements” (1995) 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1733 and Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial 
Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1999). In the 
Canadian context, Lorne Sossin has argued that the McLachlin Court’s first decade of public law 
jurisprudence can be characterized in terms of “prudential proceduralism”. See Lorne Sossin, “The 
Promise of Procedural Justice” in Wright & Dodek, supra, note 28.  
31  See generally Lorne M. Sossin, Boundaries of Judicial Review: The Law of Justiciability 
in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1999), at 229-36 [hereinafter “Sossin, Boundaries of Judicial 
Review”].  
32  See Lorne Sossin, “The Promise of Procedural Justice” in Wright & Dodek, supra, note 28. 
33  See the comments of Justices LeBel and Deschamps in Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia 
(Minister of Education), [2003] S.C.J. No. 63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 110-111 (S.C.C.):  
… the principle of separation of powers has an obverse side as well, which equally re-
flects the appropriate position of the judiciary within the Canadian legal system. Aside 
from their duties to supervise administrative tribunals created by the executive and to act 
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To take the U.S. Supreme Court as an example, it showed necessary 
and proper judicial leadership in Brown v. Board of Education34 and 
United States v. Nixon,35 but severely damaged its legitimacy in Bush v. 
Gore.36 In Brown v. Board of Education and its progeny, the U.S. 
Supreme Court was very cognizant of its relationship with the executive 
and patient and cautious in its approach. In contrast, the Supreme Court 
of Canada took a very broad, sweeping and unnecessary approach in the 
Patriation Reference, thus creating constitutional danger.  
III. OPENING PANDORA’S BOX: THE PATRIATION REFERENCE AND 
THE CREATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DANGER 
The Patriation Reference is a complicated and convoluted judgment. 
It is probably one of the best known but least read Supreme Court of 
Canada judgments. At over 150 pages and with four separate sets of 
reasons, the Patriation Reference was never going to win awards for 
clarity. In terms of judicial leadership and communication,37 it compares 
unfavourably with the Secession Reference.38 In fairness to Chief Justice 
Laskin and the members of his Court, the justices were served a dog’s 
breakfast both legally and politically: three separate references from 
different provinces with a total of nine questions with at least as many 
sub-questions.39 Essentially, there were three common questions in the 
references:40 
                                                                                                             
as vigilant guardians of constitutional rights and the rule of law, courts should, as a gen-
eral rule, avoid interfering in the management of public administration. 
More specifically, once they have rendered judgment, courts should resist the tempta-
tion to directly oversee or supervise the administration of their orders. They should gen-
erally operate under a presumption that judgments of courts will be executed with 
reasonable diligence and good faith. Once they have declared what the law is, issued their 
orders and granted such relief as they think is warranted by circumstances and relevant 
legal rules, courts should take care not to unnecessarily invade the province of public 
administration. To do otherwise could upset the balance that has been struck between our 
three branches of government.  
34  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
35  418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
36  531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
37  On Chief Justice Laskin’s leadership in the Patriation Reference, see Philip Girard, Bora 
Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (Toronto: Osgoode Society, 2005).  
38  Supra, note 16.  
39  This situation demonstrates the need for the Supreme Court to have the power to refor-
mulate reference questions and order argument on those questions.  
40  The Government of Newfoundland had added an additional question of whether the 
proposed Resolution could amend the Terms of Union of Newfoundland and Canada without the 
consent of the government, legislature or people of Newfoundland. The Supreme Court largely 
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(1) Did the proposed Resolution affect provincial legislative powers 
and/or the role of the provincial legislatures or governments within 
the Canadian federation? 
(2) Could the federal government proceed with the proposed Resolution 
unilaterally as a matter of law? and 
(3) Could the federal government proceed with the proposed Resolution 
unilaterally as a matter of constitutional convention? 
On the first question, there was no dispute. Canada conceded this point 
and the justices did not take issue with it.41 On the second question, a 
majority of seven (“The Legal Majority”) held that “[t]he law knows 
nothing of any requirement of provincial consent, either to a resolution of 
the federal Houses or as a condition of the exercise of United Kingdom 
legislative power.”42 On the third question, a majority of six justices 
(“The Convention Majority”) held that there existed a constitutional 
convention that the federal government would only proceed with 
constitutional amendment affecting provincial powers with “a substantial 
measure of provincial consent”.43 
The enduring jurisprudential legacy of the Patriation Reference is 
two-fold: the justiciability of constitutional conventions and the operative 
test for recognizing a constitutional convention. The rest of the case has 
been rendered moot by the enactment of Part V of the Constitution Act, 
1982. It is ironic that the most enduring jurisprudential legacy of a 158-
page judgment is less than half a page. Without discussion, the Supreme 
Court adopted Sir Ivor Jennings’ test for recognizing a constitutional 
convention. The Court’s complete discussion on this issue is as follows: 
The requirements for establishing a convention bear some 
resemblance with those which apply to customary law. Precedents and 
usage are necessary but do not suffice. They must also be normative. 
                                                                                                             
agreed with the reasons of the Newfoundland Court of Appeal on this issue. See Patriation 
Reference, supra, note 2. The specific question asked: 
 Question 4 — If Part V of the proposed resolution referred to in question 1 is enacted 
and proclaimed into force could 
(a)  the Terms of Union, including terms 2 and 17 thereof contained in the Schedule 
to the British North America Act, 1949 (12-13 George VI, c. 22 (U.K.)), or 
(b)  section 3 of the British North America Act, 1871 (34-35 Victoria, c. 28 (U.K.))  
 be amended directly or indirectly pursuant to Part V without the consent of the Gov-
ernment, Legislature or a majority of the people of the Province of Newfoundland vot-
ing in a referendum held pursuant to Part V?  
41  Id., at 772 (majority) and 813 (dissent).  
42  Id., at 807.  
43  Id., at 905. 
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We adopt the following passage of Sir W. Ivor Jennings, The Law and 
the Constitution (5th ed., 1959), at p. 136: 
We have to ask ourselves three questions: first, what are the 
precedents; secondly, did the actors in the precedents believe 
that they were bound by a rule; and thirdly, is there a reason 
for the rule? A single precedent with a good reason may be 
enough to establish the rule. A whole string of precedents 
without such a reason will be of no avail, unless it is 
perfectly certain that the persons concerned regarded them as 
bound by it.44 
Andrew Heard takes issue with the Court’s adoption of the Jennings test, 
offering a persuasive critique of the precedent-based nature of the test.45 
Heard catalogues competing conceptions of constitutional conventions 
that were not considered by the Court. To me it is notable that the 
Jennings test has not been adopted or commented upon by high courts in 
the United Kingdom or in Australia.  
Despite their central importance in the Patriation Reference, the 
meaning of constitutional conventions continues to be contested. The 
term “convention” is used loosely to refer to a variety of usages, customs 
and practices of the executive. There is a tendency to attempt to elevate 
many such practices to the status of “constitutional conventions”.46 
Conventions are rules that define significant rights, powers and obliga-
tions of officeholders in the three branches of government, as well as the 
relations between the different branches or officeholders.47 As Forsey 
explained, “[c]onvention is the acknowledged, binding, extra-legal 
customs, usages, practices and understandings by which our system of 
government operates.”48 Thus, the most enduring legacy of the Patriation 
Reference is a single paragraph adopting a test that was contested at the 
time and has not been followed in our jurisdictions, including the one in 
                                                                                                             
44  Id., at 888. 
45  See Andrew Heard, “Constitutional Conventions: The Heart of the Living Constitution” 
(Paper Presented to the Canadian Bar Association 2011 National Constitutional Law Conference, 
Ottawa, June 10, 2011) (cited with permission) (forthcoming in the Journal of Parliamentary and 
Public Law). 
46  See Lorne Sossin & Adam Dodek, “When Silence Isn’t Golden: Constitutional Conven-
tions, Constitutional Culture and the Governor General” [hereinafter “Sossin & Dodek, ‘When 
Silence Isn’t Golden’”] in Russell & Sossin, supra, note 14, 91, at 92-99. 
47  Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Conventions: The Rules and Forms of Political Ac-
countability (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), at 210 [hereinafter “Marshall, Constitutional 
Conventions”].  
48  Forsey, “The Courts and the Conventions of the Constitution”, supra, note 6, at 12.  
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which it originated. This is problematic at the least but also potentially 
dangerous, in the constitutional sense. However, my chief concern is that 
the Supreme Court unnecessarily answered the convention question.49 
The lasting legacy of the Patriation Reference is the justiciability of 
constitutional conventions. It is also the continuing constitutional danger 
of the decision. The judges agreed that constitutional conventions were 
political creatures and not subject to enforcement; however, in the same 
breath, the justices held that conventions are justiciable and that courts 
may “recognize” them. This distinction between “recognizing” and 
“enforcing” conventions is artificial and untenable. 
The judges agreed that conventions are political and unenforceable in 
court. The Legal Majority opined that “[t]he very nature of a convention, 
as political in inception and as depending on a consistent course of 
political recognition by those for whose benefit and to whose detriment 
(if any) the convention developed over a considerable period of time is 
inconsistent with its legal enforcement.”50 The judges further explained: 
The attempted assimilation of the growth of a convention to the growth 
of the common law is misconceived. The latter is the product of judicial 
effort, based on justiciable issues which have attained legal formulation 
and are subject to modification and even reversal by the courts which 
gave them birth when acting within their role in the state in obedience 
to statutes or constitutional directives. No such parental role is played 
by courts with respect to conventions.51 
The Legal Majority cited approvingly the academic statement that: “[t]he 
validity of conventions cannot be the subject of proceedings in a court of 
law. Reparation for breach of such rules will not be effected by any legal 
sanction. There are no cases which contradict these propositions. In fact, 
the idea of a court enforcing a mere convention is so strange that the 
question hardly arises.”52 
However, both the Convention Majority and the Convention Dissent 
held that it was appropriate for a court to “recognize” a constitutional 
convention.53 The disagreement between them was whether a convention 
                                                                                                             
49  Heard argues that both the test for recognizing a constitutional convention and the answer 
provided by the Court in the Patriation Reference were flawed. See supra, note 45.  
50  Patriation Reference, supra, note 2, at 774-75.  
51  Id., at 775. 
52  Id., at 783, quoting Colin Munro, “Laws and Conventions Distinguished” (1975) 91 Law 
Q. Rev. 218, at 228. 
53  Id., at 853 (Dissent) and 885-86 (Majority). 
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of substantial provincial consent existed.54 The Legal Majority had 
previously held that the scope of the authority under which the references 
were made in each case was “wide enough to saddle the respective courts 
with the determination of questions which may not be justiciable and 
there is no doubt that those courts, and this Court on appeal, have a 
discretion to refuse to answer such questions.”55 Yet, all the members of 
the Court agreed that the convention question should be answered. To the 
justices, that this question was “purely political” did not constitute a 
reason to refuse to answer the question. They expressed their agreement 
with the Chief Justice of Manitoba, who had stated: 
That there is a political element embodied in the question, arising from 
the contents of the joint address, may well be the case. But that does 
not end the matter. If Question 2, even if in part political, possesses a 
constitutional feature, it would legitimately call for our reply.  
In my view, the request for a decision by this Court on whether there 
is a constitutional convention, in the circumstances described, that the 
Dominion will not act without the agreement of the Provinces poses a 
question that i[s], at least in part, constitutional in character. It therefore 
calls for an answer, and I propose to answer it.56 
The Court thus concluded that the convention question was “not confined 
to an issue of pure legality but it has to do with a fundamental issue of 
constitutionality and legitimacy”.57 It thus broadly equated justiciability 
with anything arising under the Constitution. It was imprudent to do so. 
Until the Patriation Reference, one of the defining features of con-
ventions was their non-judicial character. A sharp distinction was usually 
drawn between “law”, interpreted and enforced by the courts, and 
“convention”, developed by political actors and enforced, if at all, 
through political sanctions. Thus, Hogg characterized constitutional 
conventions as “rules of the constitution that are not enforced by the law 
courts”.58 Forsey opined that: “The law of the Constitution is interpreted 
and enforced by the courts; breach of the law carries legal penalties. The 
                                                                                                             
54  The Convention Dissent chastised the majority for answering the question in a matter that 
exceeded what had been stated. According to the Convention Dissent, the question posed was 
whether it was a constitutional convention that the federal government would only proceed with a 
constitutional amendment impacting provincial powers where consent from all the provinces (i.e., 
unanimous consent) had been sought and obtained: id., at 850.  
55  Id., at 768. 
56  Id., at 884, quoting Freedman C.J.M. 
57  Id. 
58  Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, supra, note 8, at § 1.10(a).  
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conventions are rarely even mentioned by the courts. Breach of the 
conventions carries no legal penalties. The sanctions are purely politi-
cal.”59 In his seminal work on Canadian constitutional conventions, 
Andrew Heard preferred the following explanation articulated by 
Marshall and Moodie: 
By conventions of the constitution, we mean binding rules of 
constitutional behaviour which are considered to be binding by and 
upon those who operate the Constitution, but which are not enforced by 
the law courts (although the courts may recognise their existence), nor 
by the presiding officers in the Houses of Parliament.60 
Thus, one of the defining features of constitutional conventions is that 
they are not “enforced” by the courts. It is this characteristic which has 
made the Patriation Reference so problematic. 
The Patriation Reference attempted to maintain this distinction while 
holding that courts could “recognize” constitutional conventions. The 
distinction between “recognizing” and “enforcing” conventions is a 
problematic one. Barry Strayer stated that it was hard to distinguish 
between enforcing and defining conventions: “they are ‘enforced’ by 
political actors and ultimately the public in accordance with their views 
on the existence, definition, continuing relevance of, or possible need for 
modification, the convention in question. How can a court judge, let 
alone prejudge, these issues?”61  
The distinction between “enforcing” and merely “recognizing” con-
ventions does not hold up when one looks further afield. There are other 
areas where the courts, strictly speaking, do not “enforce” their rulings. 
References are the most notable category,62 but declarations against the 
Attorney General are another. In both cases, we expect compliance by 
government with the court rulings. As a practical matter, references are 
not accorded less precedential value on the grounds that they are merely 
                                                                                                             
59  Forsey, “The Courts and the Conventions of the Constitution”, supra, note 6, at 12.  
60  Andrew Heard, Canadian Constitutional Conventions: The Marriage of Law and Politics 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1991), at 3 [hereinafter “Heard, Canadian Constitutional 
Conventions”], quoting Geoffrey Marshall & Graeme Moodie, Some Problems of the Constitution 
(London: Hutchinson, 1959). Heard notes that this definition is a refinement of one first proposed by 
O. Hood Phillips in Constitutional and Administrative Law, 5th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
1973). See Heard, id., at 3, n. 4. Heard must be referring to an earlier edition of this latter text.  
61  Barry Strayer, The Canadian Constitution and the Courts: The Function and Scope of 
Judicial Review, 3d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1988), at 231, quoted in Sossin, Boundaries of 
Judicial Review, supra, note 31, at 176.  
62  See Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, supra, note 8, at § 8.6(d).  
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advisory.63 If anything, many references may be considered “strong 
precedents” because of the importance of the issues canvassed by the 
courts. So the distinction between “recognizing” and “enforcing” 
conventions is problematic ab initio. 
However, the nature of conventions makes this distinction even more 
problematic. References and declarations against the Attorney General 
are distinguished from other cases not by the substance of the issues, but 
by their procedural posture. Conversely, the justiciability of constitu-
tional conventions is distinguished from other cases precisely because of 
its subject matter. Constitutional conventions are the rules of political 
morality.64 When the courts become the political vice squad, problems 
inevitably follow. 
Courts should not opine on constitutional conventions because they 
lack the necessary nexus to enforceable legal rights. Opining on the 
existence of a constitutional convention is akin to a court’s declaratory 
judgment power. Courts will only consider exercising its declaratory 
judgment powers where “there [is] a cognizable threat to a legal inter-
est.”65 Sir Robert Megarry V.-C. explained the Court’s jurisdiction on this 
issue: 
In my judgment, the power to make declarations is confined to 
making declarations on matters that are justiciable in the courts … so if 
the proceedings are brought in respect of moral, social or political 
matters in which no legal or equitable rights arise, the objection to the 
court deciding such matters remains.66 
Thus, an English text notes that courts in that country will not grant a 
declaration about religious law or that a referee at a football match was 
right or wrong to award a penalty kick.67 We might observe that the two 
                                                                                                             
63  See Hogg, id., explaining that the black letter law is that references are not binding even 
on the parties to the reference and lack the same precedential weight as an opinion in an actual case; 
however, there are no recorded instances where a reference opinion was disregarded by the parties or 
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reference opinions are treated in the same way as other judicial opinions.  
64  Marshall, Constitutional Conventions, supra, note 47, at 7.  
65  Operation Dismantle Inc. v. Canada, [1985] S.C.J. No. 22, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, at 457 
(S.C.C.) (per Dickson C.J.C.). See the discussion in Sossin, Boundaries of Judicial Review, supra, 
note 31, at 216-19.  
66  Malone v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, [1979] Ch. 344 at 353 (D.C.). Accord 
Thorpe v. Australia (No. 3) (1997), 144 A.L.R. 677. See generally The Rt. Hon. The Lord Woolf & 
Jeremy Woolf, Zamir & Woolf: The Declaratory Judgment, 3d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2002), at 120 [hereinafter “Woolf & Woolf”]. 
67  See Woolf & Woolf, id., and n. 27, citing R. v. The Chief Rabbi, ex p. Wachmann, [1991] 
C.O.D. 309, and R. v. Football Association, ex p. Football League, The Times, August 22, 1991. 
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subject matters are really one and the same as football is often considered 
of religious importance to the English. And the same might be said of 
hockey in this country. But the importance of the issue does not qualify it 
for justiciability. If this were the case, constitutional conventions would 
surely lose out to a disputed goal in the Stanley Cup finals. Both exam-
ples share the lack of the necessary nexus to an enforceable legal right. 
The Supreme Court’s equation of “constitutional equals justiciable” thus 
overreaches. 
Moreover, even after the Court assumed the power to recognize con-
stitutional conventions in the Patriation Reference, it is a further question 
whether it is necessary or prudent for the Court to exercise this power. It 
is not. As set out in the discussion above regarding the “crisis manage-
ment” cases, in limited circumstances the Supreme Court has exceeded 
the normal bounds of judicial power in order to attempt to pour salve on 
a political dispute. The conventional wisdom is that the Patriation 
Reference successfully soothed a festering political sore. However, we do 
not know what would have happened had the Supreme Court refused to 
“recognize” the purported convention of substantial provincial consent. 
There are numerous possibilities. Perhaps 1980-81 would have been 
another failed attempt at constitutional reform and we would not have 
got the Charter. Perhaps, bolstered by the Supreme Court’s ruling, 
Trudeau would have proceeded unilaterally and would have had no need 
for a kitchen compromise resulting in either the notwithstanding clause 
or the isolation of Quebec. It is not clear whether the country would have 
ended up in a better or worse position today had the Supreme Court not 
answered the convention question in 1981. 
What is clear is that by answering the convention question and as-
suming the power to “recognize” constitutional conventions, the Su-
preme Court courted constitutional danger. It unnecessarily invited future 
controversy and conflict between the courts and the executive. In the 
next section, I explain how. 
IV. DANGER AHEAD: THE PATRIATION REFERENCE’S LEGACY OF 
JUSTICIABILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS AND 
CONTINUED CONFUSION RE THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA 
Constitutional conventions should not be justiciable. Conventions are 
a species of the Constitution and errors in constitutional adjudication are 
of greater magnitude than miscalculations in statutory or common law 
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interpretation that can be addressed by the legislature.68 However, the 
dangers of constitutional adjudication are heightened respecting constitu-
tional conventions. Constitutional conventions are “a body of constitu-
tional morality”.69 As the Supreme Court stated in the Patriation 
Reference, the main purpose of constitutional conventions is “to ensure 
that the legal framework of the constitution will be operated in accor-
dance with the prevailing constitutional values or principles of the 
period”.70 The problem is that political morality changes (hopefully 
evolving rather than regressing) and given the rarity of adjudication of 
constitutional conventions, courts are unlikely to be able to keep up with 
changes to political mores. The Supreme Court is presented with the 
opportunity to comment on most Charter rights each year, but it may not 
be presented with an opportunity to revisit a constitutional convention in 
decades. The justiciability of constitutional conventions is therefore 
destined to freeze conventions at a certain point of time.  
Moreover, as rules of political morality, conventions often express 
minimum expectations of behaviour. As political morality changes, some 
conventions should be abandoned to the dustbin of history. For example, 
there used to be acknowledged conventions about religious representa-
tion in Cabinet and on the Supreme Court. These have properly been 
jettisoned as political mores have changed. Elsewhere, Lorne Sossin and 
I have argued that the evolving political mores of accountability and 
transparency support the disclosure of reasons by the Governor General 
for controversial actions.71 This would require abandoning a purported 
convention against gubernatorial disclosure of the reasons for a deci-
sion.72 If the courts were to recognize the existence of such a convention, 
a reformist Governor General who sought to exercise power with more 
transparency and accountability would be said to be acting unconstitu-
tionally. At the least, this is a recipe for a constitutional mess. However, I 
fear it is more constitutionally dangerous than that, as Forsey has 
explained. 
Eugene Forsey was a constitutional visionary. In literal terms, Forsey 
warned soon after the Patriation Reference of the grave danger that 
                                                                                                             
68  The Askov crisis is Exhibit A respecting the problems of errors in constitutional interpre-
tation. See supra, note 28.  
69  Marshall, Constitutional Conventions, supra, note 47, at 7. 
70  Patriation Reference, supra, note 2, at 880. 
71  See Sossin & Dodek, “When Silence Isn’t Golden”, supra, note 46.  
72  Sossin and I argue both that no such convention exists and, in the alternative, that if it 
could be said to exist, it should be abandoned: id.  
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would ensue with the courts increasingly being called upon to rule on 
constitutional conventions.73 While Forsey is generally venerated in 
constitutional circles, on this issue his warnings were ignored by the 
courts. Writing in 1984, Forsey opined that there was no shortage of 
conventions or alleged conventions on which someone inspired by the 
Patriation Reference might seek a judicial decision.74 Forsey listed the 
following potential conventions for the Supreme Court’s potential 
“recognition”: 
• whether a particular defeat in the House of Commons constitutes a 
vote of confidence; 
• whether a bill dealing with language or culture requires a majority 
of votes of both English-speaking and French-speaking members of 
one House or both; and 
• whether the Senate’s veto over legislation had become unconstitu-
tional.75  
Forsey queried whether such hypothetical cases were “mere figments of 
an overheated imagination”.76 Forsey was a deep and creative thinker. He 
challenged us to think during the course of his prolific career and he 
continues to do so. His questions are not ones of an overheated imagina-
tion but of a thoughtful constitutional theorist. Forsey’s writing demon-
strates that there are serious issues with the courts “recognizing” 
constitutional conventions. 
The first problem is institutional capacity. Constitutional conventions 
inhabit their own world at the intersection of constitutional history, 
political science, public administration and law. Many political scientists 
gave the Supreme Court failing marks for its explication of convention in 
the Patriation Reference. Their position is supported by Peter Hogg, who 
gently criticized the Court’s “first foray into political science” as not 
yielding very satisfactory reasoning or conclusion.77 Conventions are 
often subtle, complex and subject to competing interpretations or 
applications. The responses to the crisis of 2008 demonstrated this.78 
                                                                                                             
73  Forsey, “The Courts and the Conventions of the Constitution”, supra, note 6, at 38.  
74  Id.  
75  When Forsey was writing the Senate had not exercised its veto in over 40 years.  
76  Forsey, “The Courts and the Conventions of the Constitution”, supra, note 6, at 39.  
77  Hogg, “Comment on the Patriation Reference”, supra, note 8. 
78  See generally Russell & Sossin, supra, note 14. See especially the competing contribu-
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Conventions do not lend themselves to the definitive answers that courts 
are good at providing in binary litigation. 
This problem of institutional capacity is demonstrated by an example 
in the Patriation Reference where the judges erroneously “recognized” a 
constitutional convention. In short, they got one wrong. As noted by 
Forsey, as an example of a constitutional convention, the dissenting 
opinion on convention cited the alleged “rule” that after a General 
Election, the Governor General calls upon the leader of the party with the 
greatest number of seats to form a government.79 This “rule” has to be 
distinguished from the widely accepted rule that if a party receives a 
majority of seats, that party’s leader should form a government and an 
incumbent Prime Minister facing such a situation should resign.80 But 
this does not appear to be what the Supreme Court is speaking about in 
its rule. Most constitutional experts would strongly dispute the existence 
of such a rule.  
The articulation of the alleged rule is flawed. It fails on the Court’s 
own terms. To invoke the Court’s tripartite test for recognizing a consti-
tutional convention: (1) What are the precedents? (2) Did the political 
actors believe that they were bound to act according to the rule? and (3) 
Is there a normative reason for the rule?81 The Supreme Court’s alleged 
rule fails on each prong. 
First, what are the precedents? They are decidedly mixed. To begin, 
Canadians did not face a minority government situation until after the 
1921 elections. In 1921, Liberal Mackenzie King won a bare majority of 
118 out of 235 seats, positioning him as the natural Prime Minister by 
convention. Due to several resignations, King’s government went back 
and forth between majority and minority. This precedent does not shed 
light on the purported rule because after the General Election, King had a 
majority.  
In 1925, King “lost” the election, receiving 100 seats to Arthur 
Meighen’s 115. However, the Progressives held the balance of power 
with 22 seats. King continued in office after the election and attempted to 
govern with the support of the Progressives. The King-Byng crisis 
erupted only after King was unable to command the confidence of the 
majority of the House of Commons — the hallmark of responsible 
                                                                                                             
79  Patriation Reference, supra, note 2, at 857, cited by Forsey, supra, note 6, at 38.  
80  See Eugene A. Forsey, How Canadians Govern Themselves, 7th ed. (Ottawa: Library of 
Parliament, 2010), at 3.  
81  Patriation Reference, supra, note 2.  
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government — and sought a dissolution from the Governor General. 
There was no indication among the political actors that the Governor 
General should have called upon Meighen with the return of the writs 
because Meighen had obtained the most seats. To the contrary, that surely 
would have precipitated an earlier crisis. Thus, this precedent is a strong 
negative one. 
In the election that followed, King obtained a plurality and was able 
to govern with the support of other smaller parties. Fast forwarding to 
1957, Progressive Conservative John Diefenbaker won a plurality over 
Liberal Louis St. Laurent. St. Laurent did not immediately resign. Four 
days after the election, Diefenbaker flew to Ottawa to meet with St. 
Laurent in his office on Parliament Hill. According to Diefenbaker, St. 
Laurent told him that several members of his cabinet were counselling 
St. Laurent to stay in office until the House met and let the St. Laurent 
government face a confidence motion. St. Laurent told Diefenbaker that 
“the people had spoken” and that unless the as yet untallied soldiers’ vote 
substantially changed matters, St. Laurent would resign.82 The press 
speculated that St. Laurent would continue in office. Several days later 
— a full week after election night — St. Laurent announced his decision 
to resign and the Governor General called upon Diefenbaker to form a 
government.83 This precedent does not support the existence of the 
purported rule. 
Diefenbaker won a majority government in the ensuing election in 
1958 but in 1962 he was back to a plurality and was able to hold on to a 
minority government with the support of the Social Credit Party. 
After he lost the 1963 election, Prime Minister Diefenbaker consid-
ered the 1925 Mackenzie King precedent. Diefenbaker “lost” the election 
to Liberal Lester Pearson, who won a plurality but not a majority of 
seats. Diefenbaker did not concede defeat on election night, nor did he 
immediately resign. In an interview on election night, he explicitly 
invoked the precedent of Mackenzie King in 1925 “when Prime Minister 
King had decided, as was his right, to meet Parliament on the basis that 
no party had a majority”.84 In fact, while he did not acknowledge it, 
                                                                                                             
82  The Rt. Honourable John G. Diefenbaker, One Canada: Memoirs of the Right Honoura-
ble John G. Diefenbaker, Volume 1: The Years of Achievement, 1956-1962 (Toronto: MacMillan 
Canada, 1976), at 36. 
83  Id., at 37.  
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Diefenbaker was following the precedent of Louis St. Laurent after the 
1957 election. Diefenbaker considered hanging on to see whether he 
could continue to govern with a minority government with the support of 
other parties, but ultimately concluded that he could not and resigned, 
paving the way for Lester Pearson to head a minority government.  
In 1965, Pearson’s Liberals won another plurality and he was able to 
continue as Prime Minister heading a minority government. Trudeau 
succeeded Pearson in 1968 and won a massive majority which was 
reduced to a thin plurality in 1972. We might wonder what would have 
happened in 1972 when on election night, the returns appeared to be 109 
to 107 in favour of the Progressive Conservatives over Trudeau’s 
Liberals, with the New Democratic Party holding the balance of power 
with 31 seats (the Social Credit Party had 15 seats and there was one 
independent). Would Trudeau have resigned to make way for Robert 
Stanfield?  
The last precedent before the Supreme Court in the Patriation Refer-
ence was the election of 1979, when Joe Clark’s Progressive Conserva-
tives won a plurality of seats. Trudeau resigned on election night, leaving 
the Governor General with Joe Clark as his only choice to call upon to 
form a government. When the Clark government fell in 1980, Trudeau 
returned to power with a majority government. 
Thus, when the Supreme Court decided the Patriation Reference in 
1981, the precedents were decidedly mixed. In the first truly minority 
situation, King set the precedent that a sitting Prime Minister can 
continue in office even if his party does not receive a plurality of votes at 
the polls. Both St. Laurent in 1957 and Diefenbaker in 1963 clearly 
thought that this was the convention when they considered holding onto 
power and we can imagine that in 1972 Trudeau would have also 
seriously considered remaining in office, even with Stanfield’s Progres-
sive Conservatives enjoying a two-seat plurality. The precedents thus do 
not support the existence of the purported rule identified by the Supreme 
Court of Canada. If anything, the precedents support the existence of a 
counter-rule.  
On the second prong of the test, the relevant political actors did not 
feel bound by the rule articulated by the Supreme Court in the Patriation 
Reference. If anything, the general understanding was that in the absence 
of any one party having a majority, an incumbent Prime Minister has the 
right to continue in office and face a confidence vote when the House 
resumes. 
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Most problematic is the third prong of the test: the normative basis 
for the rule. Forsey asserted that accepting the rule that the Governor 
General calls upon the leader of the party with the most seats to form a 
government “would transfer to the Governor General a most important 
power which properly belongs, and in a parliamentary democracy which 
properly belongs, and in a parliamentary democracy must belong, to the 
House of Commons”.85 
Let us imagine the following scenario. On election night, the results 
are inconclusive; no single party obtains a majority of seats. The official 
Opposition receives a razor-thin plurality of two more seats than the 
governing party. Two other opposition parties hold the balance of power. 
Such election results present a number of possible scenarios. On election 
night, the Prime Minister does not resign but announces his intention to 
engage in discussions with leaders of the other parties. The scenario is 
complicated by the surrounding context of statements by the Prime 
Minister and members of his party that coalitions are illegitimate and that 
“the party with the most seats should get to form a government.” On the 
basis of the Patriation Reference and the governing party’s own state-
ments, outraged members of the official Opposition demand that the 
Governor General call upon their leader to attempt to form a government. 
This of course would require the Governor General to fire the incumbent 
Prime Minister, something the Prime Minister would not take lightly and 
something that any Governor General would be understandably hesitant 
to do. 
The official Opposition — supported by friendly academics — file 
an emergency application for a declaration the next day in the Superior 
Court of Justice seeking a declaration that the Court “recognize” the 
alleged constitutional convention that the Governor General calls upon 
the leader of the party that receives the most seats in an election to form 
the government. Following the Patriation Reference, a Superior Court 
Justice issues such a declaration. What would the Prime Minister do? 
What should the Prime Minister do if he (rightly) thinks that the Court 
got the constitutional convention wrong? What would the Governor 
General do? What should he do if he also thinks that the Court got the 
constitutional convention wrong? 
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This scenario would be our own Bush v. Gore86 except worse: it 
would involve unelected judges transferring power to an unelected 
Governor General. And so predicted Forsey in 1984: 
But the next time an election fails to give any party more than half the 
seats, the leader of the largest party might well call on the Court to give 
its imprimatur to that part of the dissenting opinion of September 28, 
1981. If the Court obliged, he would then be in a position to say that it 
was the constitutional duty of the Governor-General to dismiss the 
Government in office, and call on him to form a Government. Refusal 
would be branded “unconstitutional”.87 
Thus, the Supreme Court’s inaccurate articulation of the relevant consti-
tutional convention has set the stage for confusion, conflict and potential 
crisis. In the next section, I explain how the Supreme Court has devel-
oped practical ways of avoiding adjudicating such crises. 
V. THE SUPREME COURT’S MODUS VIVENDI ON  
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 
To date, Forsey’s dire predictions have not come to fruition. The Pa-
triation Reference did not engender an onslaught of litigation around 
constitutional conventions. There are three reasons for this. First, there 
have been limited instances where constitutional conventions have been 
contentious. The crisis of 2008 is an obvious exception. We might ask 
what would have happened if Governor General Michaëlle Jean had 
declined Prime Minister Harper’s request for prorogation. We must recall 
the Prime Minister’s comments: “We will use all legal means to resist 
this undemocratic seizure of power.”88 
Second, the constitutional conventions provide relatively few oppor-
tunities for litigants.89 In contrast, another aspect of the unwritten 
                                                                                                             
86  Supra, note 36.  
87  Forsey, “The Courts and the Conventions of the Constitution”, supra, note 6, at 39.  
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89  For judicial consideration of constitutional conventions, see Ontario English Catholic 
Teachers’ Assn. v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 14, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 470, at paras. 
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constitution, the Unwritten Constitutional Principles (“UCPs”) provided 
more possibilities to litigants. In the Secession Reference, the Supreme 
Court stated that the UCPs are invested “with powerful normative force, 
and are binding upon both courts and governments”. They can give rise 
to substantive legal obligations, i.e., have “full legal force”.90 Thus, 
adjudication of the UCPs has usurped much of the role that constitutional 
conventions might otherwise have played. In particular, the unwritten 
principles of judicial independence and the Rule of Law might also be 
very well considered constitutional conventions.91 
Third, the Supreme Court has demonstrated an unwillingness to ad-
judicate constitutional conventions. This flies in the face of the precedent 
created by the Patriation Reference identified by Professor Lederman 
that “serious allegations concerning established constitutional conven-
tions are justiciable to the extent explained”.92  
Instead, the Supreme Court has engaged in issue avoidance. This is 
most recently observed in the Court’s refusal to grant leave in the fixed 
election date case, Conacher v. Canada (Prime Minister).93 On the 
Osgoode Hall Law School website TheCourt.ca, the editors of that 
publication singled out Conacher for an award for the most disappointing 
refusal of leave to appeal in 2010. In justifying this decision, they 
explained: 
Had the Supreme Court granted leave and issued a ruling in the case, it 
would have prompted unnecessary but near-certain political push-back 
from either side of the aisle over what many contend was an open-and-
shut case. And yet others would rather the court hear the appeal, as 
some uncertainty lingers about whether a constitutional convention had 
                                                                                                             
constitutional convention recognizing the reasonable autonomy of school boards); Reference re 
Canadian Assistance Plan (B.C.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 60, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525, at para. 68 (S.C.C.) 
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90  Supra, note 16, at para. 54.  
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92  W.R. Lederman, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Basic Constitutional Amendment” 
in Banting & Simeon, supra, note 5, 176, at 184.  
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in fact arisen to support the fixed date legislation. It would seem among 
TheCourt staffers that there are more in the latter camp, and so the 
Golden Gavel goes.94 
For whatever reasons, the Supreme Court decided that it wanted no part 
of this political issue.  
There are numerous ways to explain the denial of leave in Conacher. 
The first is that the case did not involve a serious allegation regarding 
established constitutional convention. It is certainly my view and those 
of other scholars that the case was neither a serious allegation nor did it 
involve an established constitutional convention.95 To the contrary, it 
involved the assertion of a creation of a new constitutional convention. I 
would think that the Court (not TheCourt.ca) could have rightly asked 
itself: “What are the precedents?” The answer to this must surely be 
“none”. As I have written, the question of the creation of a constitutional 
convention surrounding the fixed election date legislation becomes much 
more difficult after a first minister has respected the legislation for 
several rounds, creating a number of positive precedents.96 In Conacher, 
we had one negative precedent. The issue is far more interesting in 
British Columbia, should Premier Christy Clark seek an early election in 
the face of the fixed election date of May 2013, after positive precedents 
of 2005 and 2009.97 
The second possible reason for the Supreme Court to deny leave in 
Conacher is that the Supreme Court simply saw the case as inherently 
political and not requiring judicial intervention. Whether the fixed 
election date created a constitutional convention or not is beside the 
point. For Prime Minister Harper, the sanction for ignoring his own 
legislation, or for breaking constitutional convention, was to be found in 
the political realm, not the courts of law. And in the case, citizens did not 
exact any political sanction against the Prime Minister. In fact, they 
returned the Prime Minister with a stronger plurality. The political 
process played out as it should have. There was no need for court 
intervention in this case. As Forsey stated, “ ... any attempt by the courts 
to define conventions is a judicial invasion of the independence of the 
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political power and usurpation of its rights”.98 Canadians continued to 
roast the Liberal party of Stéphane Dion at the polls. Intervening in the 
Conacher case would have been an improper attempt to corral the 
Supreme Court to “pull politicians’ chestnuts out of the fire”.99 In short, 
the democratic process worked, demonstrating there was no need for 
judicial intervention to define constitutional conventions. 
VI. CONCLUSION: THE LEGACY OF THE PATRIATION REFERENCE — 
MAY 2, 2011 AND BEYOND 
At the end of the day, the Patriation Reference’s holding that consti-
tutional conventions are justiciable and that courts may “recognize” but 
not “enforce” them has had little practical effect on constitutional 
adjudication, the relationship between the courts and other branches of 
government and Canadian politics. Like the “duty to negotiate” in the 
Secession Reference, the justiciability of constitutional conventions in the 
Patriation Reference renders that judgment largely sui generis, an island 
unto itself. The Patriation Reference properly belongs to a special 
category of national emergency cases including the Manitoba Language 
Rights Reference,100 the Provincial Judges Reference101 and the Quebec 
Secession Reference.102 “In each case, the Court came up with a solution 
that arguably exceeded the normal limits of judicial power, but the 
solution was a clever one that defused the crisis.”103 What distinguishes 
the Patriation Reference is that it contains incendiary material that could 
ignite in a future crisis. The election of May 2, 2011, avoided such a 
crisis, but only through the intervention of the voters.  
Courts may need to comment on the existence of constitutional con-
ventions in the course of adjudicating other matters. In this sense, the 
Supreme Court was correct in stating that courts “recognize” the exis-
tence of constitutional conventions. However, the Patriation Reference 
erred by translating this practice of “recognition” into “declaration”. 
Constitutional conventions are dynamic rules of political morality and 
they should be left to political actors to adjudicate and sanction. The 
courts are too static to adjudicate conventions matters and they risk doing 
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more constitutional harm than good. Constitutional conventions should 
be left in the political arena to evolve, disappear and be replaced by new 
conventions. 
